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GUIDING THE SENTENCING COURT'S
DISCRETION: A PROPOSED
DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE
"NON-VIOLENT OFFENSE"
UNDER UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINE § 5K2.13
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Sentencing Commission enacted the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines in an attempt to establish a fair and effective federal
sentencing system.1 This system instituted sentencing ranges which
the sentencing court must apply when sentencing all offenders.2 The
Commission recognized, however, that there are certain factors rele-
vant to a crime or criminal for which the general Guidelines could not
fully account.3 Therefore, the Commission established policy state-
ments which enabled the sentencing court to depart from the applica-
ble Guideline when certain factors exist.4
One such policy statement is United States Sentencing Guideline
§ 5K2.13, which allows the court to use the defendant's reduced
mental capacity as a mitigating factor in sentencing.5 Section 5K2.13
sets out three requirements for departure. The defendant must have
(1) committed a non-violent offense (2) while suffering from a signifi-
cantly reduced mental capacity which contributed to the commission
1 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(3), at 2 (1994)
[herinafter U.S.S.G.].
2 See generally Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80J. CRIM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 883 (1990).
3 Id.
4 Id. Departure provisions were included in the Guidelines in order to further the
basic purposes of the guidelines which were uniformity, proportionality and honesty. See
U.S.S.G., ch. 1., pt. A(3), at 2-3, 5-6 (1993); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2) (1993); se4 e.g., U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.13.
5 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly re-
duced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants,
a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's
criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.
Id. (emphasis added).
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of the offense and was not caused by voluntary use of drugs or other
intoxicants, and (3) a criminal history which does not indicate a need
for incarceration to protect the public. Elements (2) and (3) are gen-
erally fact specific inquiries that have not produced opposing legal
views and are infrequently reviewed on appeal. 6
Conflict has arisen within the federal circuits, however, regarding
the interpretation of element (1), the commission of a non-violent
offense. 7 The Sentencing Commission failed to adequately define the
phrase "non-violent offense" in the Guidelines and the Supreme
Court has yet to examine this issue. Although this phrase appears to
be straightforward, the federal courts have been unable to establish a
consistent interpretation.
The majority of circuits have defined the term "non-violent of-
fense" as any crime that does not have "as an element the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force. .... "8 These circuits
have held that this definition of "non-violent offense" is the con-
trapositive of the definition of "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.13. 9 Therefore any crime defined as violent under § 431.2, in-
cluding threats of violence, are not "non-violent offenses."' 0
A minority of circuits have concluded that this approach is not
supported by the policies underlying §§ 431.2 and 5M2.13.11 As such,
6 See, e.g., United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 1994). The defendant pled
guilty to one-count of mailing threatening communications. Id. The district court found
"[given the overall picture... that defendant suffered from a major depressive episode."
Id. at 537. On appeal, the government did not dispute the defendant's significantly re-
duced mental capacity or the conclusion that his criminal history did not warrant incarcer-
ation to protect the public. Id.
7 Compare United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (which held that
the definition of "crime of violence" in § 4B1.2 should not control the application of
§ 5K2.13) with United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.) (which held that the definition
in § 4B1.2 should control the application of§ 5K2.13), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 93 (1991); see
also, United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323,1327 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a split within
the circuits and temporarily holding the definition found in § 4B1.2 applicable to § 5K2.13
because, under Eleventh Circuit case law, they were bound by the earliest decided case).
This conflict has even produced a split within a circuit. Compare United States v. Rus-
sell, 917 F.2d 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (applied definition found in § 4B1.2) with United States
v. Philibert, 947 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1991) (did not mention definition found in § 4B1.2).
The Eleventh Circuit, while tentatively holding the majority approach, discussed infra at
notes 59 through 84 and accompanying text, applicable, has left the issue open for an en
banc determination. See Dailey, 24 F.3d at 1327.
8 See Poff 926 F.2d at 588; Russell 917 F.2d at 517; United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d
91, 94 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989).
9 See United States v. Weidrick, 19 F.d 32 (9th Cir. 1994); Poff 926 F.2d at 592; Russel
917 F.2d at 517; Borrayo, 898 F.2d 94; Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791; Madda/ena, 893 F.2d at 819.
10 See, e.g., Poff 926 F.2d at 592.
11 See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1446; Weddle, 30 F.2d at 532; see also Philibert, 947 F.2d 1467
(determining whether offense was one of violence without examining the definition found
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they have applied a fact specific inquiry to determine whether the un-
derlying conduct was indeed non-violent. 12
This Comment suggests that the current interpretations of "non-
violent offense" are inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the
Sentencing Guidelines and § 5K2.13 in particular, because they fail to
adequately balance a determinate system with the leniency intended
by § 5K2.13. The courts adopting the majority approach fail to recog-
nize textual difficulties with their analysis, as well as the leniency es-
poused by § 5K2.13. The courts adopting the minority rationale have
failed to offer sufficient guidance to the sentencing court. Therefore,
this Comment offers a new approach that balances these competing
interests.
To better understand the following discussion, Part II briefly dis-
cusses the history of sentencing and sets forth the concerns con-
fronting Congress when promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines.
Part III discusses the approach taken by the majority of the federal
circuits. It analyzes the rationale of the approach and offers criticisms
of its rationale. Part IV summarizes the minority approach and sets
forth criticisms of its interpretation. Part V then proposes a revision
of § 5K2.13 in light of the current provision's failure to provide the
just sentencing scheme envisioned by Congress when establishing the
Guidelines and its policy statements.
II. HISTORY
For most of the past century, the federal government's system of
sentencing criminals was largely indeterminate.'1 While statutes spec-
ified penalties for crimes, they typically gave the sentencing court
broad discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcer-
ated, for how long, and whether some other form of punishment,
such as probation or a fine, should be imposed in place of imprison-
ment.' 4 This system was supplemented by parole, which allowed the
offender to return to society earlier than his sentence would have al-
lowed under the "guidance and control" of their parole officer. 15
This system of discretionary sentencing and parole was based on
the desire to rehabilitate the offender, thereby minimizing the risk
that he would resume criminal activity upon his unsupervised return
in § 4B1.2); United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); United
States v. Bellrichard, 801 F. Supp. 263, 269 (D. Minn. 1992) (same).
12 Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1446.
13 See Theresa Katie & Thomas Sager, Are theFederal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Conges-
sional Goals: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 393-94 (1991).
14 Id.
15 See id.; see also Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938).
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to society.16 Each criminal's amenability to rehabilitation was neces-
sarily an ad hoc determination made by the individual's sentencing
judge and parole officer.1 7 Thejudge and parole officer would assess
the criminal's amenability to rehabilitation before handing down the
sentencing and release decisions.' 8 Therefore, sentencing officials ex-
ercised great discretion. 19
The wide discretion exercised by sentencing officials, however,
led to serious disparities in sentences. 20 Also, the indeterminate sen-
tencing system produced high recidivism rates. Critics questioned re-
habilitation as a theory of punishment and regarded its goals as
unattainable in most cases.2 ' Therefore, Congress determined that a
new system, which incorporated alternative theories of punishment,
was necessary. 22
The first step in moving away from the discretionary system came
in 1958, when Congress authorized the creation ofjudicial sentencing
institutes and joint councils, whose purpose was to formulate sentenc-
ing standards.23
In 1973, still unhappy with the system of sentencing currently in
place, the United States Parole Board adopted guidelines that estab-
lished a "customary range" of confinement. 24 In 1976, Congress en-
dorsed this initiative through the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act.2 5 In that act, Congress attempted to give the Pa-
role Commission a role in moderating "the disparities in the sentenc-
ing practices of individualjudges."26 Under the new system, the judge
continued to set the sentence within the statutory range fixed by Con-
gress, while the Parole Commission set the prisoner's actual release
date.
This indeterminate sentencing system failed in two respects.
16 See Karle & Sager, supra note 13, at 393-94.
17 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and then Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MiNN. L.REv. 803, 812-13 (1961).
18 See Karle & Sager, supra note 13, at 393-94.
19 See Kadish, supra note 17, at 812-13.
20 See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing. 41 U. CIN. L. Ruv. 1, 54 (1973).
21 SeeS. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., lst Sess. (1983); H.R. REP. No. 1017, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984); 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 (1984); see also NORVAL Mowus, THE FUTURE oF IM-
PluSoNMENT 24-43 (1974); F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABnILTATIVrE IDEAL (1981).
22 See Nagel, supra note 2, at 883-84.
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1993).
24 See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 391 (1980) (discussing a
matrix combining age at first conviction, employment background, other personal factors,
and offense severity rating to establish a customary range).
25 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218, repealed by tit. 2 § 218(a) (5) (Supp. 1996) (effective
1997).
26 See generally S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, at 19 (1976); see also United States v. Addonizio,
442 U.S. 178, 189 (1979).
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First, the system created great variation among sentences imposed by
different judges on similarly situated offenders.2 7 For instance, a sta-
tistical survey of the Second Circuit revealed that sentences imposed
in almost identical cases ranged from three to twenty years.28
Second, the system created uncertainty as to the time the of-
fender would actually serve in prison.2 9 Race, sex, and the region in
which the defendant was convicted, among other things, caused these
differences. 30 These unfair disparities and uncertainties caused a
widespread public concern because they proved to be a serious imped-
iment to an evenhanded and effective criminal justice system.31
Congress recognized the need for a new system because these
new approaches failed to cure the "shameful" and "unjustified" conse-
quences of this failing system. 3 2 After wrestling with the problem for
more than a decade, 33 Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984.34
27 See Frankel, supra note 20, at 54. Judge Frankel, an outspoken critic of the pre-guide-
lines system, found that "[t ] he evidence is conclusive thatjudges.. ., administering statutes
that confer huge measures of discretion, mete out widely divergent sentences ... explaina-
ble only by the variations amongjudges." Id.
28 See ANTHONY PARTIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
STUDY- A REPORT TO THEJUDGES 1-3 (1974). See also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HosTRA L. REv. 1, 4 (1988).
In a separate study, 47 Virginia District Court judges similarly exhibited wide disparity
in sentencing the same offender. William Austin & Thomas A. Williams, Ill, A Survey of
Judges'Responses to Simulated Legal Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68J. CrM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 306, 306-10 (1977). Thesejudges examined five hypothetical cases and "pro-
duced a variety of patterns of disparity, but some form of disparity was always present." Id.
at 306.
29 See Breyer, supra note 28, at 4; see also, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTics-1 9 8 7 , at 142-43 (Katherine M. Jamison &
TimothyJ. Flanagan eds., 1988).
30 Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings on Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Justice of the House Comm. of theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 676-77 (1987) (testimony
of Ilene H. Nagel, U.S. Sentencing Commissioner).
31 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 40 (1983). The report on the 1984
Sentencing Act referred to the "outmoded rehabilitation model" for federal criminal sen-
tencing and recognized that the efforts of the criminal justice system to rehabilitate
criminals had failed. Id.
32 Id. at 38.
33 Before settling on the Guidelines at issue here, Congress considered numerous other
competing proposals for sentencing reform. It rejected strict determinate sentencing,
which would have offered mandatory sentences for each offense, because it concluded that
the Guideline system would be successful in reducing sentencing disparities, while retain-
ing the flexibility needed to adjust for unanticipated factors arising in a particular case. Id.
at 78-79. Additionally, Congress rejected a plan that would have made the Guidelines only
advisory because some legislators feared that under such circumstances, they would not
produce the desired changes. Id. at 79.
34 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was passed as Chapter II of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-437 §§ 211-39, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified in
U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 3621-25, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)).
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The main goal of the Sentencing Reform Act was to channel judi-
cial discretion through a highly structured sentencing scheme
designed to promote honesty,3 5 uniformity, and proportionality 6 in
sentencing.37 To promote honesty, Congress eliminated the parole
system for federal prisoners sentenced after the Commission insti-
tuted the Guidelines.38 As a result, a sentence imposed by the court
would be the sentence served in prison, less approximately fifteen per-
cent reduction for good behavior.3 9 To promote uniformity and pro-
portionality, the Sentencing Reform Act established the Federal
Sentencing Commission to promulgate the detailed Sentencing
Guidelines which judges must follow when imposing sentences. 40
As part of the Sentencing Reform Act Congress enacted a Guide-
lines Manual, which set out goals that Congress intended to achieve by
enacting the Sentencing Guidelines.41 The statutory mission states
that:
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984... provides for the development of
Guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment:
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. The Act
delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize
the federal sentencing process.42
Additionally,
Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the
wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses com-
mitted by similar offenders. [It also] sought proportionality in sentenc-
ing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for
criminal conduct of differing severity. 43
35 "By 'honesty' Congress meant to end the previous system whereby a judge might
sentence an offender to twelve years, but the Parole Commission could release him after
four." Breyer, supra note 28, at 4.
36 By "uniformity" and "proportionality," Congress intended "to reduce unjustifiably
wide sentencing disparity." Id.
37 U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A(3), intro. cmt. (1994).
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988 & Supp. II 1994); U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A(l) and (2), intro.
cmt. The Parole Board was scheduled to be phased out within five years after the adoption
of the Guidelines and all prisoners sentenced under the pre-Guidelines system were to be
assigned specific terms of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1), (3) (1988). To further
promote honesty, all sentences were reviewable for conformity with the law, rather than
abuse of discretion. 18 U.S.C. §§ 8742 (a), (b), (e) (1988 & Supp. m 1991).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988).
40 "The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency of the judicial
branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex-officio members. Its principal
purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice
system that will assure the ends ofjustice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing
the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes." U.S.S.G., ch.1,
pt.A(l), intro. cmt. (1994).
41 U.S.S.G., ch.1, pt. A, intro. cmt. (1994).
42 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2).
43 U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A(3), intro. cmt
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As can be evidenced by these statements, rehabilitation was no longer
the sole theory behind sentencing.44 Further, Congress intended to
totally replace the current system with a more structured scheme
designed to limit judicial discretion. 45
Congress also enacted a number of specific directives to further
narrow the Commission's drafting discretion.46 For example, statutes
instructed the Commission to take into account the nature and de-
gree of harm caused by the offense, community views and concerns
about the gravity of the offenses, and aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances when establishing offense categories.47 These directives
also allowed the Commission to consider the nature and capacity of
the correctional facilities and services.48 Finally, the maximum range
of imprisonment for each sentencing category could not exceed the
minimum by more than twenty-five percent.49
These goals led the Commission to create the Sentencing Guide-
lines, a basically determinate sentencing system.50 It created a generic
sentencing table containing forty-three vertical offense levels and six
horizontal criminal history levels.51 Every federal offense was assigned
a base vertical level ranging from level one, the lightest sentence, to
level forty-three, the most severe. Similar offenses were grouped into
generic categories. All offenders sentenced under the same offense
category received the same base offense level.5 2 The base level would
be increased or decreased in exactly the same manner when "specific
offense characteristics" were involved.53 A prisoner's sentence could
only be reduced by any credit earned while in custody.
Federal judges did retain some limited discretion to sentence
outside the prescribed guideline range. If the sentencing judge found
departure was warranted from the range prescribed by the Guidelines,
he must support that finding in a writing stating his reasons.54 This
44 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1993).
45 See Nagel, supra note 2, at 884.
46 See id. at 902-06 for a summary of the directives.
47 28 U.S.C. § 994 (c) (1988).
48 28 U.S.C. § 994 (g) (1988).
49 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1988).
50 See Charles Ogeltree, The Death Of Discretion? Reflections on the Sentencing Guidelines,
101 HARv. L. RPv. 1938, 1944-46 (1988). The Commission intended to design a sentencing
system that reduced the disparities in the sentences of defendants convicted of similar
crimes. Id. at 1944; see also, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 547 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991).
51 U.S.S.G., ch.5, ptA (Sentencing Table), (Nov. 1994). The Sentencing Commission
established clear rules to determine an offender's criminal history level. Nagel, supra note
2, at 922-25.
52 Nagel, supra note 2, at 922-23.
53 Id. at 923.
54 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
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authority merely allowed the sentencing judge to depart from the
Guidelines when certain mitigating or aggravating factors existed. 55
To promote fairness and leniency, the Guidelines made the exist-
ence of a significantly reduced mental capacity one such mitigating
factor.56 However, the Commission determined that significantly re-
duced mental capacity was relevant only where the offender commit-
ted a non-violent offense.57
III. THE MAJORITY APPROACH
A. REASONING
The majority of the circuits have defined the phrase "non-violent
offense" narrowly.5 8 They have held that the definition of "non-vio-
lent offense" is controlled by the definition of "crime of violence" in
§ 4BI.2.5 9 As such, the definitions of "non-violent offense" under
§ 5K2.13 and "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2 are mutually exclu-
sive. 60 Section 4B1.2 defines "violent crime" as:
any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.6'
Therefore, any crime defined as violent under § 4B1.2, including
threats of violence, is not a "non-violent offense."62
While many circuits have adopted this view, only the Seventh Cir-
55 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. (departure due to significantly reduced mental capacity);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b). The sentencing court is allowed to depart if it finds present a
mitigating or aggravating factor which the Commission did not adequately consider when
formulating the guidelines. Id. A mitigating factor is one that, in fairness and mercy, may
be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. See, e.g., People
v. Morrin, 187 N.W.2d 434 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). An aggravating factor, on the other
hand, is any circumstance attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or
enormity or adds to its injurious consequences. Id. at 434.
56 See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.
57 See id.
58 SeeUnited States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.) (6-5 en banc decision), cert.denied 502
U.S. 829 (1991); United States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1989).
59 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1).
60 See United States v. Weidrick, 19 F.3d 32 (9th Cir. 1994); Poff, 926 F.2d at 588; Russell
917 F.2d at 517; Borroyo, 898 F.2d at 91; Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791; Maddaena, 893 F.2d at 819.
61 U.S.S.G. § 431.2. (emphasis added).
62 Poff, 926 F.2d at 588; Russell, 917 F.2d at 517; Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791; Bornz'o, 898 F.2d
at 91; Madda/ena, 893 F.2d at 819.
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cuit offers any detailed explanation to support this definition.63 Spe-
cifically, the court asserted three points to support their approach.
First, the court noted that U.S.S.G. § IBl.l(i) directed the court to read
the Guidelines as a whole. 64 It reasoned therefore, that since the root
word violent appeared in two different, though related sections, it
must have the same meaning in both sections.65 Specifically, the
court stated that where the same word was used in both phrases, "a
rather heavy load rests on him who would give different meanings to
the same word or the same phrase when used a plurality of times in
the same Act .... "66
The court found support for this reasoning in the Armed Career
Offender Act, where Congress defined the term "violent felony" in
exactly the same manner as the Sentencing Commission defined
"crime of violence" in U.S.S.G § 4B1.2. 67
Although the phrases were slightly dissimilar, the court found it
"nigh impossible to divine any distinction between a 'violent felony'
and a 'violent offense."' 68 Similarly, regarding the Sentencing Guide-
lines, the court reasoned that had the Commission desired to distin-
guish among types of violence, it would have expanded its
vocabulary.69 Because the Commission did not, it is "difficult to dis-
cern a difference between 'violent offense' and 'crime of violence.' 70
The court thus refused to "tease meaning from ... the use of a prepo-
sitional phrase [of violence] rather than an adjective [violent]."71
Second, the Seventh Circuit claimed that every court dealing with
the issue concluded that "non-violent offense" is defined by reference
to "crime of violence."7 2 In fact, most courts found the issue so obvi-
63 Poff, 926 F.2d at 588.
64 Id. at 592.
65 Id. at 588; see also United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369, 377 (7th
Cir. 1945).
66 United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.) (quoting Montgome y Ward, 150
F.2d at 377), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991); see also Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d
218, 228 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (defining the word "information" the same in two differ-
ent tax statutes); Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. 162, 165 (1871) ("Both acts are in pari materia,
and it will be presumed that if the same word be used in both, and a special meaning were
given it in the first act, that it was intended it should receive the same interpretation in the
latter act. . . ."); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1944).
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B); see also United States v. Vidaure, 861 F.2d 1337, 1340
(5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dickerson, 901 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Mathis, 739 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1990) (determining whether a crime is a violent felony
under 18 U.S.CA § 924(e) requires examination of the elements of the crime charged as
well as the underlying conduct).
68 See Poff 926 F.2d at 591.
69 Id. at 592.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 591.
72 Poff, 926 F.2d at 592.
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ous that they made the determination with little or no discussion.7"
The court asserted that where every court dealing with an issue
came to the same conclusion and the legislative body had failed to
take action, that resolution should be presumed correct.74 The court,
therefore, asserted that by failing to respond to this view, the Sentenc-
ing Commission had impliedly accepted the majority position. 75
Third, the court argued that any alternative definition would re-
quire the courts to guess as to the meaning of "non-violent offense." 76
Even if the Commission intended to define "non-violent offense" dif-
ferently, the court could "do little but guess as to its mieaning. ' 77 The
court noted that when an alternative approach necessitates guesswork
on the court's part, it is more prudent to select a definition offered in
another section of the statute.78 The court found it problematic that
there was no authority suggesting that the definition of "non-violent
offense" would be either more or less restrictive than the definition
found in § 4B1.2. 79 When formulating the definition of "non-violent
offense," the court would not have anything to guide it except its own
beliefs. As such, the court deemed it prudent to apply an available
definition of a similar phrase.80 Therefore, the definition of "crime of
violence" found in § 4B1.2 was found applicable to the phrase "non-
73 See United States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 517 (11th Cir. 1990).
The crime here, armed robbery, is a crime of violence regardless of whether the
weapon [the defendant] carried into the bank was fired or even loaded: the use or
threatened use of force is an element of the offense.... [T]he term crime of violence
includes the crime of robbery.... No doubt the Commission recognized that robbery
by its nature involves the threat of violence. Therefore there is no departure allowed.
Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 548 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991)); see also United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990)
(stating that the "[d]efendant would have us conclude that § 5K2.13's use of the term
'non-violent' means something other than the opposite of a crime of violence. We can find
no support for such a contention .... "); United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating that "[b]ecause 'non-violent offense' is not defined in the guidelines, we
defer to the definition of 'crime of violence' in... [U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2]. We find no basis for
a conclusion that the Commission intended any other meaning."); United States v. Mad-
dalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that the "[d]efendant's rob-
bery. . .'involved the threatened use of physical force' . . . [as defined under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2] .... Thus section 5K2.13 is not applicable to defendant, for he did not commit a
non-violent offense."); United States v. Speight, 726 F. Supp. 861, 866 (D.D.C. 1989) (de-
parting from the guidelines under § 5K2.13 where the crime did not meet the definition of
"crime of violence" under § 4B1.2.).
74 United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588,593 (7th Cir.) (citing In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340
(7th Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 592.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 591.
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violent offense" in § 5K2.13. 81
B. CRITICISMS
Although the Seventh Circuit offered an in depth discussion of
the factors supporting their approach, their analysis fails on many
levels. While it was able to assert three points to support its approach,
each point is problematic. Additionally, the court failed to take into
account the policies incorporated in the Guidelines and in § 5K2.13
in particular. Therefore, the majority approach is not the proper ap-
proach to defining the phrase "non-violent offense."
The court's textual analysis fails in four respects. First, there is no
authority to read the Guideline in the manner in which the majority
suggests. U.S.S.G. § IBl.l(i), which the court used to support its tex-
tual analysis, offers no such direction. It merely states that the court
should
[r]efer to Part H and K of Chapter Five, specific offender characteristics
and departures, and to any other policy statement or commentary in the
Guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence.
In fact, the Guidelines prohibit unauthorized cross referencing of
definitions. 82 When discussing the applicability of the definitions
found in the general definitions section, the Guidelines stated that
"[d]efinitions of terms also may appear in other sections. Such defini-
tions are not designed for general applicability."8 3 Therefore, accord-
ing to the methods of statutory interpretation mandated by the
Guidelines, the definition of "crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2 can-
not be used to define "non-violent offense" in § 5K2.13.
Second, it is clear that the same phrase does not exist in both
sections. "It would have been easy to write § 5K2.13 to say that the
judge may depart unless the defendant committed a 'crime of vio-
lence' as § 4B1.2 defines it."84 The Commission, however, elected
to use separate formulations in each section, "crime of violence" and
"non-violent offense."85 Where Congress elects to use different
phrases, those phrases should have distinct meanings. 86 The mere
81 Id. at 588.
82 U.S.S.G. § IBI.1, cmt. 2.
83 Id.
84 United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
85 See id. (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
86 See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) (stating distinct phrases
have different meanings); Zabieiski v. Montgomery Ward, 919 F.2d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir.
1990) (same); United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); Tafoya v.
United States Department of Justice, LEAA, 748 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1984)
(same); Lankford v. LEAA, 620 F.2d 35, 36 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Seeber v. Washington,
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fact that the Commission used the words "violent" and "violence" is
irrelevant because the court must examine the entire phrase.87
Therefore, since the two phrases are distinct, they must be defined
differently. a8
Third, the phrase "crime of violence" is a term of art that is not
generally applicable to other sections with similar phrases.8 9 To de-
fine a "crime of violence," one must examine the elements of the of-
fense. 90 Where an element of an offense is violence, even the
unrealized prospect of violence, that offense is a "crime of violence."91
Further, courts have noted that it is better to define words and
phrases according to their normal meaning instead of defining them
by using a term of art.92 The ordinary legal and lay meaning of the
phrase "non- violent offense" involves the conduct of the offender and
not the element of the offense.93 Therefore, the same specialized def-
inition does not apply to both sections.
Moreover, the Guidelines themselves suggest different meanings
for the phrase "non-violent offense" and "crime of violence."94 Ac-
cording to § 4B1.2, "crime" encompasses the elements of the felony or
misdemeanor which is the subject of the conviction. 95 However, the
Guidelines specifically define the term "offense" as "all relevant con-
duct... "96 Thus, the two nouns in the respective sections are differ-
ent and each requires a distinct analysis. The word "crime" suggests
that the court examine the language of the criminal statute in ques-
tion to determine whether the criminal defendant acted violently.
The word "offense," on the other hand, suggests that the court ex-
amine the underlying conduct of the offense, and not merely the stat-
ute, to determine the nature of the defendant's actions.97
Establishing the precise nature of the acts of a given defendant has
634 P.2d 303, 306 (Wash. 1981) (same).
87 See Pittston Coal; 488 U.S. at 115.
88 United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
89 Id.
90 See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
91 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (discussing sentencing enhance-
ment provision with similar policy to that of § 4Bi.2).
92 Id.
93 See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DicrIoNARY 1565 (3d ed. 1966).
94 U.S.S.G. § IBLI.1, cmt. (b).
95 U.S.S.G. § 4Bi.2. See also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 575 (examining elements of crime, not
underlying conduct); United States v. Wilson; 951 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); United
States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991); United
States v. John, 936 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1991) (same).
96 U.S.S.G. § IBl.1, cmt. l(1).
97 Id. See also United States v. Leavitt, 925 F.2d 516, 518 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating when a
statute's terms cover separate kinds of behavior, the court should look beyond the words of
the statute and to the indictment and perhaps the jury instructions as well).
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nothing to do with determining the elements of a given "crime of vio-
lence."98 Therefore, because the definition found in § 4B1.2 exam-
ines the elements of the crime, it is incompatible with the Guidelines'
suggested definition of "non-violent offense" in § 5K2.13.99
While the majority recognized the difference between the word
"offense" and the word "crime," it fails to adequately dispose of the
issue and it only addresses the issue in a parenthetical, which is unper-
suasive. 100 While recognizing that there might be a difference be-
tween the terms, the court does not find the distinction significant
because "'offense' encompasses a broader spectrum of illegality than
does 'crime."'10' The court, however, neither explains the ramifica-
tions nor offers any authority for this assertion. Therefore, the Com-
mission's different formulations in each section must be given their
distinct meanings.
Merely because Congress and the Commission defined other
slightly different terms the same as "non-violent offense" is not suffi-
cient to determine that another similar phrase is defined the same. 10 2
The majority attempted to account for the difference between "crime
of violence" and "non-violent offense" through a comparison to 18
U.S.C. § 924, the Armed Career Offender Act. There, the phrase
"violent felony" is defined the same as "crime of violence."' 03 Such a
comparison makes sense: both phrases are virtually identical. The
only minor difference is that "violent felony" includes only felonies,
while "crime of violence" includes both felonies and misdemeanors.
More importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 924 and U.S.S.G § 4B1.2 are both ca-
reer offender provisions. Therefore, both statutes intend to increase
punishment for those who are more dangerous and thus deserving of
increased incapacitation.
Fourth, in addition to the suggestion within the Guidelines that
98 United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 1988). See also United
States v. McVicar, 907 F.2d 1, 2 (Ist Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Borroyo, 898 F.2d
91, 94 (9th Cir. 1990) (examining the conduct of the crime to determine whether it is
'crime of violence' under § 4B1.2); United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir.
1990) (same).
99 United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v.
Selfa, 918 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990) (elements of the crime committed and not the particu-
lar conduct of the defendant controls the applicability of § 4B1.2).
100 United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
The parenthetical states that "[o]ne might ascribe significance to the use of 'offense' in
§ 5K2.13 and 'crime' in § 4B1.2, but that would not help appellant since 'offense' encom-
passes a broader spectrum of illegality than does 'crime.'" Id.
101 Id.
102 See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450.
103 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (3) (which defines "crime of violence") with 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 (e) (2) (B) (which defines "violent felony").
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these two phrases be defiied differently, the Commission's lack of a
cross-reference between the two sections is significant. 04 A cross-ref-
erence between the two sections clearly would have alleviated the
problem, yet the majority deemed this absence a meaningless over-
sight.'0 5 In dismissing this criticism as overly critical hindsight, they
found it hardly surprising that the Commission failed to foresee the
argument that a crime of violence could, under the sentencing Guide-
lines, also be a non-violent offense.' 0 6 This conclusion, however, fails
to recognize that the Commission did use explicit cross-referencing in
other sections. For example, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 expressly adopts the
definition of "crime of violence" as found in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.107 At
least two other sections in the Sentencing Guidelines expressly adopt
the definition of "crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2.' 08 Moreover,
the Commission has amended § 4B1.2 twice in the last two.years with-
out providing a cross-reference with § 5K2.13.10 9 The lack of a cross-
reference is a curious omission if the two sections were linked as
tightly as the majority suggests."10
Although drafters sometimes fail to recognize that a similar
phrase exists in another section .and, thus, believe the two are
equivalent, here the Sentencing Commission wrote the Guidelines as
a unit and paid special attention to the relationship among sec-
tions.' As evidence of their care, they amended the Guidelines 359
times over the three years prior to the Poff decision. 112 Had they in-
tended to define the terms the same, they would have stated it explic-
itly with a cross-reference between sections. Thus, it makes sense to
attribute different meanings to the phrases "non-violent offense" and
"crime of violence."113
Because the Guidelines offer neither a specific definition or
cross-reference, any approach involves guess work. The majority
chooses not to apply another definition because they would have to
guess the definition of "non-violent offense." 1 4 Because there is no
cross-reference in § 5K2.13 that states the definition in § 431.2 is ap-
104 Poff 926 F.2d at 592.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 U.S.S.G. § 4Al.1, cmt. 6.
108 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1, cmt. 2; U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b) (3).
109 United States v. Chamian, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
110 Id.
HI United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989).
112 Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452.
113 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985).
114 See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedA 502 U.S. 829
(1991).
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plicable to § 5K2.13, however, the approach used by the majority is
also nothing more than guess work." 5 In fact, their approach violates
the maxim of statutory interpretation prohibiting the court from
adopting an interpretation of a federal criminal statute which in-
creases an individual's penalty when that interpretation is based on a
mere guess as to Congress' intent.1 6 This rule applies equally to
sentences as it does to criminal statutes." 7 The majority approach
removes the sentencing court's discretion in many situations and thus
forces the court to impose higher sentences where they might other-
wise want to impose a more lenient one. Therefore, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's guess that the definition found in § 4B1.2 applies to § 5K2.13 is
no more valid than the approach criticized by the Seventh Circuit.
Further, the majority's approach fails to take into account the
maxim giving effect and meaning to each word of a statute." 8 The
court could not interpret the language of a statute so as to render
words and phrases meaningless. 1 9 The conclusion that the definition
of "crime of violence" in § 4B1.2 controls the definition of "non-vio-
lent offense" in § 5K2.13 renders that phrase meaningless because it
merely becomes an alternative way of saying "crime of violence." This
is an unintended result as it is the job of the drafters to create and not
to destroy.' 20 The majority's reading violates this rule of statutory con-
struction and renders superfluous the phrase "non-violent offense."' 21
The problems with the majority's analysis are not limited to the
interpretation of the text. The majority's assertion that the circuits
were unanimous on this issue is also incorrect.122 At the time the Sev-
enth Circuit made their assertion in Poffin 1991, the circuit's were not
unified. Although they did not expressly adopt an alternative ap-
proach, the Tenth Circuit determined the court's authority to depart
under § 5K2.13 without making reference to § 4B1.2.123 In effect,
15 Cf Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958) (stating that interpretation of
criminal statute must be based on more than guess work).
116 See id. at 178; see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 695 (1980); Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978).
117 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U S. 114, 121 (1979); see also Simpson. 435 U.S. at
14-15.
118 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (stating that each word of
a statute shall be given meaning); see also Inhabitants of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S.
147, 152 (1883).
119 See Menasche 348 U.S. at 538-39.
120 See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937).
121 See Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538-39.
122 See, e.g., Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (adopting the minority ap-
proach); United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying the minority
approach).
123 United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1990).
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they used a fact specific inquiry similar to the approach later adopted
by the D.C. Circuit. 24 All circuits dealing with the issue had not de-
termined that § 4B1.2 controls the definition of "non-violent offense"
found in § 5K2.13. Thus, the Commission's silence is not an implied
approval of the majority's view.
Further, the Seventh Circuit's analysis also fails to take into ac-
count the policies of the Guidelines. In proposing that "non-violent
offense" is defined identically to "crime of violence," the court misap-
plied United States v. Montgomery Ward. 12 At issue in Montgomery Ward
was the definition of the word "production" in the War Labor Dis-
putes Act.' 26 To determine the definition, the Seventh Circuit ex-
amined the definition of the same word in the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 27 Both of the Acts set up the mechanism for the settlement of
disputes between employer and employee. 28 The only difference was
that one statute dealt with peace time disputes and the other with war
time disputes. Nevertheless, the purpose of the two Acts, settling la-
bor disputes, was the same.
The same cannot be said here. The policy considerations behind
these two sections of the Sentencing Guidelines suggest that they are
not in pari materia and thus, the definitions should be different. The
two sections have vastly different agendas. Section 4B1.2 asks whether
a individual is a career offender and should therefore receive a higher
sentence than others who have committed the same offense.'2 9 The
career offender provisions were enacted to punish those offenders
that have shown a penchant for committing violent acts, whether they
go through with those acts or not. 30 These offenders are subject to
longer sentences in order to deter criminal conduct, provide just pun-
ishment, and protect the public from further crimes by the of-
fender.'3 ' Thus, § 4B1.2 does not grant the career offender the
124 See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450.
125 150 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1945).
126 Id. at 377.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988). Congress here directed the Commission to ensure that
the Guidelines specify prison sentences that are at or near the maximum term authorized
for career offenders. Those offenders include persons who have been convicted of a fel-
ony that is either a crime of violence or a drug offense and who have been previously
convicted of two felonies where each was either a crime of violence or a drug offense. Id.;
see also United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1089 (1990).
130 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (1993).
131 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (1994); see also U.S.S.G., ch. 4, pt. A, intro. cmt. (1994)
(stating a defendant with a prior criminal record is more culpable than a first time of-
fender and thus deserving of greater punishment); 128 CONG. REC. 26,518 (1982) (Sen.
Kennedy) (stating in support of 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) that the "shrinking law enforcement
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benefit of the doubt and instead assumes the worst because career
offenders are clearly dangerous to society. 32
On the other hand, the policy concerns motivating § 5K2.13 are
entirely distinct. U.S.S.G. § 5K(2.13 wishes to treat with lenity offend-
ers whose reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of
the offense.' 3 3 The Commission intended to maintain the usual sen-
tencing practices of judges prior to the enactment of the Guide-
lines. 134 In the past, judges routinely handed out lower sentences to
persons who, though not legally insane, were not in full command of
their actions and thus not fully responsible for their actions and not
worthy of harsh sentences. To maintain these past practices, the Com-
mission encouraged lower sentences for those with reduced mental
capacity.
Also, the rule of lenity suggests that where a "reasonable doubt
persists about a statute's intended scope" after an examination of the
text and policies of the statute, the court should opt for "the construc-
tion yielding the shorter sentence.' u3 5 The policies of § 5K2.13, leni-
ency to those who were not fully responsible for their acts, suggest that
the court has the opportunity to grant a shorter sentence to an of-
fender with a diminished mental capacity. To accomplish this goal,
the phrase "non-violent offense" should encompass the broadest
range of offenses, therefore granting the sentencing court the author-
ity to depart in the broadest of circumstances.
In addition to the policies of the Guidelines, the theories of pun-
ishment incorporated into the Guidelines support a lenient reading
of § 5K2.13. Two theories of punishment that influence sentencing
determinations, the desert and deterrent theories, support leniency
when the offender suffers from a diminished mental state.13 6 Under
the desert theory, persons who cannot control their conduct do not
deserve as much punishment as those who act with malice or for per-
sonal gain, because those who lack self-control are not as blameworthy
resources must be targeted on incapacitating" those who repeatedly commit violent
crimes); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (Background Note).
132 See U.S.S.G., ch. 4, pt. A, intro. cmt. (1994).
133 See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
134 U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1994) (noting that the Commission examined pre-sentenc-
ing practices to determine the ranges for the sentencing guidelines.).
135 See United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (stating if a court encounters
a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of an act, the court may
interpret the act most favorably to the defendant to avoid an absurd or glaring unjust
result); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Ladner v. United States,
358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
136 See Poff 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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as those acting with evil intent
Under the deterrent theory, legal sanctions are less effective with
people who suffer from diminished mental capacity, because sanc-
tions will not deter someone whose actions are beyond his self-con-
trol. 3 7 Thus, under both theories those with diminished mental
capacity deserve less severe punishment
Because both the desert and deterrent rationales support depar-
ture where the offender suffers from a significantly reduced mental
capacity, the critical determination is whether the offender is danger-
ous.13 8 If the sentencing court deems the offender dangerous, the
court should not have the authority to depart from the Guidelines;
however, when the offender is not dangerous, the court should be
granted the authority to depart if it wishes. In order to determine
whether the offender is dangerous to society, the court must examine
the underlying conduct of the offense and not merely the elements of
the crime.
The majority's examination of the elements of the crime leads to
anomalous results. Under the majority's approach, the innocuous
threatener is treated exactly the same as a terrorist bomber whose
bomb does not explode due to incompetence, because the majority
approach treats any threat in the same manner, whether or not the
threatener intended to carry out the threat. The Sentencing Commis-
sion could not have intended such anomalous results.'3 9 Instead,
where the offense shows that the offender is not dangerous to society'
and incarceration would, at most, serve a limited purpose, the court
should have the authority to depart if it deems proper.140 Under such
circumstances, it seems "highly implausible that the Sentencing Com-
mission intended to prohibit a downward departure under section
5K2.13."141
IV. THE MINORITY APPROACH
A. REASONING
A minority of circuits have refused to hold the definition of
"crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2 applicable to the definition of
137 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169,
189-90 (1968), reprinted in GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HuMAN BEHAVIOR
39, 59-60 (1976).
138 See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
139 See United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464, 467-68 (1994) (determining
that the Court will not interpret a statute to create anomalous, unjust results).
140 Poff 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
141 United States v. Chatinan, 986 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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"non-violent offense" found in § 5K2.13.142 Instead, those courts have
chosen to adopt their own approach to determine what is, in fact, a
non-violent offense. 143 Here, the courts examine the underlying con-
duct of the offense to determine whether the offender committed a
violent offense. 144 The text and the policies of the Guidelines support
this approach. 145 The language of the text suggests that the § 5K2.13
definition is distinct from all other phrases in the Guidelines. 146 In
addition, the policies of the statute and the Guidelines suggest an al-
ternative definition of "non-violent offense" to the definition of
"crime of violence" found in § 4B1.2.
While the minority agrees that the definition of "crime of vio-
lence" found in § 4B1.2 does not apply to the definition of "non-vio-
lent offense" found in § 5K2.13, adherents disagree on which
definition should apply. Some suggest that one definition of a non-
violent offense is an offense that does not involve "mayhem."147
When examining the conduct of the offender, it was "[ t] he pros-
pect of violence (the 'heartland' of the offense, in the Guidelines'
argot) [that set] the presumptive range; when things turn[ed] out bet-
ter than they might, departure [was] permissible."1 48 This language
was the central theory behind the idea that the meaningless threat-
ener should not be treated as a violent offender. The Seventh Circuit
dissenters chose to set the presumptive range at the existence of may-
hem.149 Mayhem, defined at common law,
required a type of injury which permanently rendered the victim less
able to fight offensively or defensively; it might be accomplished either
by the removal of (dismemberment), or by the disablement of, some
bodily member useful in fighting. Today, by statute, permanent disfig-
urement has been added; and as to dismemberment and disablement,
there is no longer a requirement that the member have military signifi-
142 See id.
143 See, e.g., id. at 1452 (establishing a fact specific inquiry into the underlying conduct of
each offense to determine whether the offense is non-violent).
144 See id.
145 See supra notes 82 through 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criti-
cisms of the rationale supporting the majority approach and, accordingly, the rationale in
support of the minority approach.
146 The minority makes one unneeded concession regarding the majority's reasoning by
stating that "[a] lthough a textual argument supports this conclusion [that § 4B1.2 controls
§ 5K2.13], we should not attribute this heartlessness to the Sentencing Commission unless
we must-and we needn't." United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir.) (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991). While it is true that we should not
attribute such heartlessness to the Commission, the text does not support such a conclu-
sion. See U.S.S.G. § IB1.1, cmt. n.2 (prohibiting random cross-referencing of context-spe-
cific definitions of terms).
147 Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
149 See id.
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cance. In many states the crime of mayhem is treated as aggravated
assault.150
Using mayhem as a baseline allows the court to depart when the of-
fender commits certain violent acts that do not reach this level of seri-
ousness or when the offender fails in his attempt at the commission of
a serious offense.
Some circuits adopting the minority view, however, have refused
to adopt this definition. 151 Instead, those circuits have chosen to ex-
amine the specific facts of each case to determine whether the offense
was violent or non-violent.152 They offer no definition; instead, it is
up to each individual sentencer to determine whether or not the of-
fense entailed violence.153
B. CRITICISMS
The criticisms of the minority approach are limited. The use of
an inquiry into the underlying conduct of each case has been ques-
tioned. 54 However, greater dispute has arisen regarding the alterna-
tive definitions applied to determine whether an offense is in fact
non-violent, because each is flawed in its own respect. The first defini-
tion defines "non-violent" too broadly. However, the second defini-
tion's attempt to correct this error does not offer any guidance to
courts functioning within a system of limited discretion. Therefore,
courts need a new definition that will allow the court sufficient discre-
tion but also give substantial guidance.
Some have criticized the use of an inquiry into the specific facts
of each case. 155 The Chatman court noted its authority to examine the
facts of each case even when determining the applicability of
§ 4B1.2.156 The court derived this authority from United States v. Bas-
kin,157 which held.that the sentencing judge retains discretion to ex-
150 BLACK's LAW DIcrIoNARY 979 (6th ed. 1990).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Chatnan, 986 F.2d 1446, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (vacating
sentence and remanding for determination that bank robbery at issue was a non-violent
offense).
152 Id. at 1453.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 1455 (Ginsburg, D.H., J., concurring).
155 See id. at 1454 (Ginsburg, D.H.,J., concurring); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911
F.2d 542, 546-48 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991).
156 Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 n.7 (citing United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 388-90
(D.C. Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990); United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d
295, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991), United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124, 1131-32 (D.C. Cir.), cet.
denied, 502 U.S. 871 (1991)).
157 United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1453 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Baskin,
886 F.2d at 389). The defendant in Baskin had been convicted of possession and intention
to distribute drugs. The sentencingjudge was confronted with a complex set of facts. The
defendant had been convicted of armed robbery in the past. If that crime was a "crime of
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amine the facts of a predicate crime to determine whether it was a
crime of violence under the career offender provisions of the Guide-
lines and whether the court could depart from the Guidelines. 58
Where such a rule existed, the sentencing court is allowed to examine
the facts of each case under § 5K2.13 to determine whether to depart
from the Guidelines.
If the rule of Baskin led to the holding in Chatman, however, any
circuit without such a precedent would necessarily have to rule that a
fact specific inquiry was not applicable. 15 9 Moreover, the Eleventh
Circuit questioned the validity of Baskin: "[tihe D.C. Circuit [in Bas-
kin] seems to suggest that a sentencing court [take into account] ...
the facts of a prior conviction when determining the appropriateness
of departure. We cannot believe that the Commission intended such
a result."160 If one accepts this criticism, it is the elements of the
crime and not the underlying conduct of the offense that should con-
trol the inquiry under § 5K2.13.
However, criticism of the Chatman court is hardly axiomatic for
three reasons. First, the Chatman majority relied very little on the Bas-
kin decision. 16' Second, although the Eleventh Circuit questioned the
Baskin holding, it was recently affirmed by the D.C. Circuit' 62 Third,
merely because a fact-specific inquiry is not valid does not mean that
§ 4B1.2 contains the applicable definition. It is clear that a definition
other than the one in § 4B1.2 is applicable to § 5K2.13.' 63
The majority approach failed in its attempt to offer an alternative
definition. Likewise, both the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit
dissenters in Poff and the Chatman court are problematic. While the
violence" then the defendant would be classified as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
Additionally, the sentencing judge admitted that he would have liked to impose a less
severe sentence if the facts of the case demonstrated a factor not adequately taken into
consideration by the Guidelines. Baskin, 886 F.2d at 383.
158 Baskin, 886 F.2d at 389. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (court has authority to depart from
Guidelines where there exists factors that Guidelines failed to adequately take into consid-
eration). However, the district court did not examine the underlying conduct of the of-
fense when making either determination. Baskin, 886 F.2d at 389.
159 See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454 (Ginsgurg, D.H.,J., concurring).
160 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 550-51 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 933 (1991); see also United States v.John, 936 F.2d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting
that "it is not only impermissible, but pointless, for the court to look through to the de-
fendant's actual criminal conduct" where the prior conviction is for a crime an essential
element of which is the use or threatened use of force).
161 Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1453 n.7 ("We emphasize.., that our decision today does not
rely on Baskin.").
162 United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Butler, 924
F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871 (1991).
163 See supra notes 82 through 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criti-
cisms of the majority approach.
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Poff dissenters attempt to define the phrase, "non-violent offense" as
one that does not involve mayhem, 64 they fail to offer any other gui-
dance. Moreover, this definition may cover too few offenses.' 65
Crimes that do not actually result in violence still may indicate that a
defendant is "exceedingly dangerous, and should be incapaci-
tated."166 The Poff dissenters seem to imply that any offender who
attempts to commit a violent act but fails due to incompetence should
be granted a departure. 167 This says too much. The incompetent
criminal should not benefit because "things turned out better than
they might."168 Where the offender exhibits an intention to commit
the offense, he should not be given the benefit of his failure to actu-
ally carry out the threat.169 Departing from the Guidelines would run
contrary to the purposes of § 5K2.13 because it would give the sen-
tencing court the authority to depart in cases where the offender is
dangerous to society.' 70
It is clear, however, that the Commission did not intend for the
sentencing court to "treat the innocuous threatener and the murder-
ous one identically."' 7 ' In this regard, the Seventh Circuit has found
the correct distinction: the important difference between one of-
fender and the next is the objective intention to commit the
threatened act.'72
The D.C. Circuit in Chatman, recognizing difficulties with the Sev-
enth Circuit proposal, applied a fact specific inquiry. 73 While the
court seemed to suggest the correct resolution, they did not complete
the task. In criticizing the approach of Judge Easterbrook, the D.C.
Circuit stated that where "an offense.., involved a real and serious
threat of violence-such as assault with a deadly weapon" it cannot fall
within the realm of offenses characterized as non-violent 74
While the sentencing court need not limit itself to examining
164 United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
165 See United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
166 See id. at 1454.
167 See Poff 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
168 Cf id. (Easterbrook,J., dissenting) ("The prospect of violence ... sets the presump-
tive range; when things turn out better than they might, departure is possible.").
169 Cf id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
170 See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.
171 Id.; see also United States v. Lucas, 619 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1980) (bank robbery with
toy gun was sufficient to sustain a conviction for bank robbery committed by "force and
violence, or by intimidation.").
172 See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 43 (1975) (Marshall,J., concurring); see also
Lucas, 619 F.2d at 870 (examining objective facts to determine whether conduct was
intimidating).
173 United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
174 id. at 1454.
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whether the offense actually entailed violence or mayhem, it is insuffi-
cient to leave the court without a test.175 Such a solution cuts against
the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines-consistency in sentencing
throughout jurisdictions' 76-and, as such, will lead to a regression to
the indeterminate sentencing systems of the past.
Although it may be effective in some cases to allow the court to go
on a case by case basis,177 this is not one of those situations. The
Guidelines are a comprehensive set of rules that are designed to limit
the sentencing court's discretion.' 78 Thus, the Supreme Court must
offer a definition to the lower sentencing courts.
V. A RESOLUTION
Thus far, the judicial system has failed to adequately define the
phrase "non-violent offense." Neither § 5K2.13 nor the Sentencing
Guidelines offer an adequate test for courts to apply. Therefore, the
courts have been given the difficult task of filling in the blanks left by
the Sentencing Commission. The circuits' conflicting approaches
have failed to take into account the factors underlying § 5K2.13 in
particular and the Sentencing Guidelines in general. A new approach
is needed.179
The Seventh Circuit conceded that there is "an argument in favor
of permitting downward departures ... when the prospect that [an
offender] will carry through with threats seems nill."180 Recognizing
that rationale, this Comment proposes a new approach in order to
achieve the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines and § 5K2.13. It offers
the sentencing court a lenient and guided approach to departure
under U.S.S.G § 5K2.13.
This approach defines "non-violent offense" as:
(1) any course of conduct that does not involve
175 See Nagel supra note 2, at 883-84.
176 U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. (Nov. 1994).
177 See, e.g.,Jacobelis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating
"I know it when I see it" when defining the undefinable, pornography).
178 U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 3; see also United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409,
1412 (9th Cir. 1989); Karle & Sager, supra note 13, at 393.
179 However, this dispute may be moot because the Commission's failure to adequately
define "non-violent offense" under § 5K2.13 and, thus, to differentiate between the clear-
minded terrorist and the mentally incapacitated threatener may constitute a failure to ade-
quately take'into consideration the mitigating factor of reduced mental capacity. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines, 58 U. CHI. L. REv.
901, 912 n.41 (1991). If such is the case, then the court has the authority to depart regard-
less of the definition it gives to the term "non-violent offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); Al-
schuler, supra at 912 n.41. But, because no court has adopted this view, the question
remains ripe for Supreme Court review.
180 United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 558, 593 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
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(a) the use or
(b) attempted use of physical force.
(2) A threat of physical force is a non- violent offense unless the of-
fender has committed an overt act which evidences an intent to commit
the threatened act.' 8 '
A threat would, in effect, rise to the level of an attempt where the
actor has committed an overt act.'82 Such overt acts would include,
but not be limited to, the possession of some materials to be used in
the commission of the offense at or near the place contemplated for
its commission or lying in wait, searching for or following the contem-
plated victim, or any other act that evidences an intent to commit the
violent act. 83 The proposed definition would also incorporate crimes
such as assault with a deadly weapon or attempted armed robbery
where a threatening note was given to the teller, but would not involve
a threat of physical harm that a reasonable person would not know
would culminate in the commission of the offense.' 84 Here, the court
would receive guidance without restricting the court's discretion. 8 5
In this manner, the sentencing court can exercise its guided discre-
tion to determine whether to depart from the Guidelines. 8 6
One jurisdiction has argued that any threat is a crime of violence
and thus must not be included in the definition of "non-violent of-
fense." 8 7 The Seventh Circuit has argued that the Supreme Court
defines threats as a form of violence and thus they fail to meet any
definition of non-violent offense.' 88 The court based its analysis on
the Supreme Court's determination that threats "may be costly and
dangerous to society in a variety of ways, even when their authors have
no intention whatever of carrying them out."8 9 This was further evi-
denced by the statutes criminalizing the utterance of the threats and
181 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1985) (examining conduct which is strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose).
182 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1985) (determining what level of conduct constitutes
an attempt to commit the violent act).
183 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1985) (stating overt acts evidencing an intent to
commit the attempted act).
184 See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 45 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
185 SeeScott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (Powell,J., concurring) (stating that the
hundreds of district courts throughout the country need guidance); see also Baldasar v.
Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 231 (1980) (Powell,J., dissenting) (regretting the formulation of an
approach to the right to counsel that lacked guidance).
186 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 547 (1982) (stating the goal of the crimi-
nal justice system is to treat similarly situated defendants similarly).
187 See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-92 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829
(1991).
188 Id. at 591 (noting that "[t]hreats are themselves a form of violence..."; therefore,
they cannot constitute a non-violent offense under § 5K2.13).
189 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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not the intent to carry them out.'9 0 In fact, when the defendant
manifests an intent to carry out the threats, the Guidelines required
courts to increase the sentence from the base offense level.19 ' Thus, a
threat is a form of violence that cannot also be a non-violent offense.
However, the Seventh Circuit's assertion that the Supreme Court
held that threats were a form of violence is mistaken. The Supreme
Court has never held that threats were a form of violence. While Jus-
tice Marshall in Rogers did discuss the potential harms caused by a
threat,' 92 he never described threats as a form of violence. He merely
discussed the negative effects that threats have on society. 9 3 Clearly
then, threats are punishable conduct. 94 However, Justice Marshall's
analysis does not suggest that a threat cannot be non-violent. There-
fore, this Comment suggests that a threat by itself, while punishable,
need not be a violent offense. A threat in conjunction with some
other dangerous act, on the other hand, would constitute a violent
offense.
In addition, some may argue that this new approach offers a term
of art similar to the one criticized by this Comment.1 9 5 However, this
new approach merely attempts to lay out, in an organized manner, the
ordinary meaning of the phrase "non-violent offense." In doing so, it
is able to incorporate the majority's underlying notion of a strict defi-
nition with the minority's attempt at leniency through broadened
court discretion. The proposed definition thus balances these com-
peting interests and offers an ordinary meaning of the phrase "non-
violent offense."
Because this Comment attempts to offer the ordinary meaning of
the phrase "non-violent offense," some may argue that section (2) of
the proposed definition should take into account the state of mind of
the victim instead of the state of mind of the offender. Such an ap-
proach would recognize that the mere threat of violence, whether
committed or not, inflicts emotional harm on the intended victim.19 6
190 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 876 (1994); see also United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703,
707 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that threat itself, and not the intent to carry it out, is the
punishable offense); United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1990)
(stating defendant's inability to carry out threat is irrelevant).
191 See U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b).
192 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 46-47 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that "[p]lainly, threats
may be costly and dangerous to society in a variety of ways, even when their authors have
no intention whatever of carrying them out.").
193 See id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
194 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 876 (1994) for examples of federal statutes criminalizing
threats.
195 See supra notes 89 through 93 and accompanying text for a criticism of the use of a
term of art.
196 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 45 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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This type of approach would be based on whether a reasonable per-
son could interpret the actions as intending violence instead of
whether the offender intended violence.' 97 This would amount to a
negligence standard. However, the court has long been reluctant to
infer a negligence standard in criminal statutes.' 98 The important de-
termination is whether or not the offender intended to commit the
violent act.
If the court determines that the offender is not worthy of incapac-
itation because he did not intend to commit the threatened act and
thus is not dangerous, it may depart. However, if the court feels that
the offender was dangerous and was reasonably likely to commit the
threatened activity if not incarcerated, then the court is not bound to
adhere to the Guidelines. 99 While other approaches would offer the
court similar choices, this approach guides the courts' actions without
severely limiting its discretion to exercise its leniency on worthy of-
fenders. This would promote the goals of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 and the
Sentencing Guidelines.
Thus, under this approach offenders will receive sentences that
are commensurate with their actual blameworthiness and dangerous-
ness.200 Examine, for example, the case of Carolyn Poff.2 0 ' Ms. Poff
was "a forty-four year old woman convicted [of] writing six threaten-
ing letters to President Reagan in 1988."202 Her father, now deceased,
sexually abused her until she was twenty.20 3 As an adult, she moved in
and out of psychiatric institutions.204 Among the manifestations of
this abuse was her penchant for threatening public officials, at what
she believed, was at the behest of her dead father.205 Ms. Poff had also
previously been convicted of threatening President Carter, but never
actually attempted to complete any threatened activity.20 6 At sentenc-
197 See United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989). An offense is
violent where "an ordinary person [in the same situation as the victim] reasonably could
infer a threat of bodily harm." Id.; United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir.
1987); see also United States v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1991).
198 Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); see also Rogers v. United States, 422
U.S. 35, 45 (1975) (MarshaIIJ., concurring).
199 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (stating that it is completely within the court's discretion to depart
from the Guidelines, thus dangerous offenders will be incarcerated).
200 See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 199 (1983) (asserting a need to protect the
proportionality principle, so that legislative abuse of sentencing powers does not lead to
the defendant's degree of punishment exceeding his just deserts).
201 United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829 (1991).
202 Id. at 590; see also 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994).






ing, the court held that it did not have the authority to depart from
the sentencing guidelines and sentenced Ms. Poff to fifty-one months
in a correctional facility.20 7
This result exemplifies the problems with the majority approach
because even the Secret Service acknowledged that Ms. Poff was not
considered a real threat to the President.208 A just result would allow
the system to help Ms. Poff become a functional member of society
once again while serving a probationary sentence. Under this pro-
posed definition, the Sentencing Court would have the authority to
sentence Ms. Poff outside the statutory range because other than the
threatening notes, she never took any additional steps to carry out her
threats.20 9 In fact, the frequency with which Ms. Poff sent the letters
only further proved that she was an innocuous threatener and deserv-
ing of lenient treatment by the sentencing court.
A more difficult case is presented by Anthony R. Weddle.210 Mr.
Weddle pled guilty to mailing threatening letters to a man he had
previously assaulted.211 Mr. Weddle's guilt was obviously not at issue,
yet his sentencing presented a difficult question to the sentencing
court.2 12 A literal application of the Sentencing Guidelines directed
the court to sentence Mr. Weddle to between fifteen and twenty-one
months in jail.213
The court, however, examined the circumstances surrounding
Mr. Weddle's actions before determining the proper sentence.21 4 Mr.
Weddle was a sympathetic figure, as he was an otherwise upstanding
member of society who found himself in a situation that caused him to
lose control of his actions. He was a police officer with a family.2 1 5 In
1992, he was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease.216 Soon thereafter,




210 See United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 1994).
211 Id. at 534. On September 11, 1992, Mr. Weddle attempted to drive Mr. Gary An-
gleberger off the road and when that failed, he followed him back to his home and at-
tempted to assault him with a "slapjack." Mr. Weddle pled guilty to this offense and was
sentenced to probation. Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 535. Pursuant to the plea agreement, both parties stipulated to the applicable
sentencing guidelines, arriving at an offense level of 13. Additionally, the probation officer
recommended a one criminal history point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4A.I(c) and
two criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A.l(d) for his actions while already on pro-
bation. These enhancements placed him in criminal history category II, which required
the court to impose a 15-21 month sentence. Id. at 535.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 534.
216 I'd.
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went to live with another man named Gary Angleberger.21 7 Because
of these traumatic events, Mr. Weddle became severely depressed.2 18
In this depressed state, he sent a threatening note to Mr. Angleberger
through his sister-in-law.219 This message stated that Mr. Weddle
would hunt Mr. Angleberger down and "eliminate him from the pic-
ture" if he did not stop seeing Mr. Weddle's wife.2 20 The message also
made reference to the possibility of Mr. Angleberger's children be-
coming fatherless. 221 After Mr. Angleberger failed to respond to this
note, Mr. Weddle began mailing and delivering threatening letters di-
rectly to Mr. Angleberger's home.222
Subsequent to an arrest for assaulting Mr. Angleberger and
forced to resign from the police force, Mr. Weddle sent an envelope
to Mr. Angleberger that contained three .38-caliber bullets.223 For
this he was arrested and pled guilty to mailing threatening letters.2 24
Based on these circumstances, his probation officer suggested that the
sentencing court depart from the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 and impose a lighter sentence.2 25 The Fourth Cir-
cuit applied the minority approach aforementioned fact specific in-
quiry and held that mailing threatening communications was a non-
violent offense.2 26 Thus, having departed from the Guidelines, the
court sentenced Mr. Weddle to three years probation.2 27
The new definition proposed by this Comment would produce
the same result because the threats for which Mr. Weddle was con-
victed never went beyond the threat stage. Although Mr. Weddle had,
in the past, committed violent acts, he never took any steps toward
carrying them out. The proposed approach allows the court to be
lenient where the offender deserves sympathetic treatment, but re-
stricts the courts discretion where the offender is clearly dangerous.
Thus under this structured system, the sentencing court may grant a








224 Id. at 535.
225 Id.
226 See id. at 540. Applying the "clearly erroneous" standard, the Fourth Circuit upheld
the District Court's determination that Mr. Weddle's offense was non-violent. The District
Court held "that [defendant's] threatening letters were not violent in and of themselves,
and [that] there was no violence other than that which occurred on that one occasion





The new approach to non-violent offenses suggested by this Com-
ment attempts to offer a lenient, structured approach to the sentenc-
ing courts. Going to jail or serving probation are vastly different
outcomes. The Guidelines fail to define the phrase "non-violent of-
fense" and have left the courts with the difficult task of filling in the
holes left by the Guidelines. The majority approach fails in this task
because it misinterprets the text of the Guidelines and, more impor-
tantly, ignores the purposes of the Guidelines and § 5K2.13, which
support leniency in this situation. Further, the minority approach ig-
nores the purposes of the Guidelines because it fails to limit the dis-
cretion of the courts in any manner. Unless either the judicial system
remedies this confusion or Congress amends the Sentencing Guide-
lines to include a more clear definition, the present existing situation
is prone to unjust results. Therefore, it is imperative that the defini-
tion of "non-violent offense" in § 5K2.13 guide the court's discretion
so that offenders receive sentences commensurate with their blame-
worthiness and are not unjustly punished.
SETH A. TRAvis
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